An interview conducted by Dr. Adrian Leonard Mociulschi
Few places reveal the changing character of war more clearly than the Black Sea. Here, naval power, energy infrastructure, autonomous technologies and geopolitical rivalry converge in ways that are reshaping strategic thinking far beyond the region. What was once considered a peripheral frontier has become a laboratory of the future.
To explore these developments, I spoke with Rear Admiral (Ret.) Hasan Özyurt, former Chief of Operations of the Turkish Naval Forces and former Chief of Staff of NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group Two. Our conversation ranged from the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the enduring legacy of the Montreux Convention to the rise of maritime drones, the future of naval warfare and the role Romania's new HISAR-class vessel may play in an increasingly contested maritime environment.
Adrian Leonard Mociulschi: Admiral Özyurt, thank you for joining us.
The Black Sea has returned to the centre of international attention in recent years. Why does it matter so much today, and what do many people outside the region still fail to understand about its strategic importance?
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Hasan Özyurt: The Black Sea has always mattered; what has changed is that the rest of the world has rediscovered it. First and foremost, it is a sea shared by six littoral states. One of them is a major power, for which the Black Sea provides its only direct access to warm-water routes. Türkiye, meanwhile, possesses the region's longest Black Sea coastline.
The Black Sea is both Russia's southern gateway and a gateway into Russia. The same is true of Central Asia, as well as countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran. For Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia, it remains the principal gateway to the wider world.
Its relatively small size also makes the Black Sea highly vulnerable to both conflict and environmental pressures. The evidence is all around us: drifting mines left by the war; attacks on commercial shipping that could trigger major environmental disasters; disruptions to Ukrainian grain exports and Russian fertiliser exports, significant enough to threaten food security in Africa and beyond; and pollution carried by the Danube and generated by the coastal states themselves, which affects marine ecosystems and, ultimately, the economies that depend on them.
The Black Sea has retained its strategic importance throughout modern history, and the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936 and now approaching its centenary, remains one of the clearest expressions of that fact. The Convention was designed both to preserve the regional balance and to shield the Black Sea from broader geopolitical rivalries. During the Cold War, it played an important role in maintaining the military equilibrium between NATO and the Soviet Union in this region.
I am among those who believe that the Convention has also played a significant role in preventing the current war from escalating into a wider confrontation. Its wartime provisions, activated at the outset of the conflict, have prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet with naval assets from other theatres, while also limiting the entry of warships from non-littoral states. As a result, the naval dimension of the conflict has, at least so far, remained largely confined to the Black Sea.
Once peace is restored, I believe the principle of regional ownership should be reaffirmed without delay. It will be essential to the peace, stability and economic development of the region. By limiting the presence of non-littoral warships, the Montreux Convention places primary responsibility for security on the navies of the Black Sea states themselves. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye have already demonstrated what this can look like in practice through their joint mine countermeasures task group, established in 2024. Practical cooperation among neighbours who share these waters remains the most reliable foundation for long-term security in the Black Sea.
The war that began in 2022 has turned these long-standing realities into daily headlines. We have seen a major fleet pushed back toward its eastern bases by an adversary with almost no conventional navy. We have seen merchant ships, ports and energy infrastructure become military targets. In recent weeks, attacks on commercial shipping have intensified once again, while proposals for a maritime moratorium, including one put forward by Türkiye, have yet to secure agreement. When grain prices fluctuate thousands of miles away because of events off Odesa or Novorossiysk, the Black Sea can no longer be regarded as merely a regional issue.
There is another reason as well. The Black Sea has become a laboratory. Nearly every concept now debated in naval headquarters, from unmanned surface vessels to the protection of undersea cables and offshore energy infrastructure, has been tested here under real combat conditions. Navies far beyond this region follow developments in the Black Sea closely because it offers a glimpse of their own future.
Adrian Leonard Mociulschi: If the Black Sea has become a testing ground for the future of naval warfare, it has also highlighted the enduring importance of maritime presence and adaptable naval platforms.
Against this backdrop, the Romanian Naval Forces recently commissioned a HISAR-class vessel built in Türkiye, a symbol of the growing naval cooperation between two Black Sea allies.
From your operational perspective, what makes a modern corvette such a valuable asset, and what role can a vessel of this type play in meeting the security challenges of today's Black Sea?
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Hasan Özyurt: First, let me congratulate the Romanian Naval Forces on the commissioning of Contraamiral August Roman. She was handed over in Istanbul on 20 June, the very day her sister ship, TCG Koçhisar, entered service with the Turkish Navy. Two ships built by the same team, now sailing under different flags on the same sea, are a fitting symbol of the close relationship between our navies.
I would also like to highlight an important point. These vessels were originally designed for the Turkish Navy's own requirements, and their design reflects decades of operational experience. In my view, that distinguishes them from a conventional export product. The transfer of this capability strengthens the partnership between our two allied navies and enables us to share not only technology, but also operational know-how and lessons learned. The Turkish Navy's willingness to transfer technologies that it has developed and employs itself is, I believe, one of the clearest expressions of mutual trust between allies.
As for their operational value, this class emerged from two factors: the proven success of the Ada-class corvettes in Turkish service and the lessons learned from years of operational experience. The Turkish Navy maintains an active presence across several maritime theatres, from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, while also supporting NATO operations. Such a commitment requires ships that combine capability with affordability, and that is exactly what this class was designed to deliver. I am confident these vessels will strengthen the operational capabilities of the Romanian Naval Forces and enhance their ability to maintain a sustained presence at sea.
Whether it is classified as a light corvette, as Romania does, or as an offshore patrol vessel, as originally conceived in Türkiye, its strength lies in the balance it achieves between capability and affordability. At approximately 2,300 tonnes and 100 metres in length, it can operate effectively through the harsh winter conditions of the Black Sea, embark a helicopter, and support boarding teams as well as special operations forces. At the same time, its operating costs are low enough to sustain a continuous presence at sea, rather than limiting deployment to periods of crisis.
The design also offers considerable room for future growth. Sufficient space, weight and integration capacity have been reserved for additional systems, and I understand that Romania intends to equip the vessel with anti-ship missiles as part of its further development.
In today's Black Sea, the most valuable missions are often the most practical ones: maintaining maritime domain awareness; protecting offshore energy infrastructure such as Romania's Neptun Deep gas field, together with critical undersea cables and pipelines; securing commercial shipping; supporting mine countermeasure operations; conducting search and rescue missions; and safeguarding sovereign rights within the exclusive economic zone. A vessel of this class can carry out all of these tasks with a crew of roughly one hundred sailors.
In naval affairs, presence is a capability in its own right. The principle of regional ownership places both rights and responsibilities on the Black Sea states. Maintaining a sustained presence at sea and contributing to the peace and security of the region are among the most important of them. In that spirit, I believe these vessels will make a significant contribution to security in the Black Sea and within NATO operations.
Adrian Leonard Mociulschi: If modern corvettes remain essential instruments of maritime presence, the Black Sea has also shown that the future of naval warfare will increasingly involve unmanned systems. Maritime drones have already changed the way naval operations are planned and conducted.
How do you see naval drones and autonomous vessels shaping the future of maritime security in the Black Sea?
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Hasan Özyurt: Unmanned maritime systems have already changed the Black Sea. That is no longer a prediction; it is a lesson written by the experience of the past four years. Small, relatively inexpensive surface drones, employed with ingenuity and persistence, have forced a large and heavily armed fleet to rethink where and how it operates. Every navy in the world has taken notice.
But we should be careful not to draw the wrong conclusion. Drones have not made the warship obsolete; they have made the unprotected and predictable warship vulnerable. They are highly effective at denying freedom of action at sea, but they are far less capable of controlling maritime space, escorting convoys, clearing minefields or protecting ports over extended periods of time. Sea control still depends on crewed vessels, trained sailors and sound professional judgement. The future belongs to navies that can successfully integrate both capabilities.
In the Black Sea, I see three areas in which unmanned systems are likely to have the greatest impact. The first is persistent maritime surveillance. From offshore platforms and undersea cables to shipping lanes and critical infrastructure, unmanned vessels can remain on station for days at a fraction of the cost of a crewed ship.
The second is mine countermeasures. Once this war ends, clearing the Black Sea of mines is likely to require years of sustained effort. Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles make it possible to carry out this dangerous work without exposing sailors to unnecessary risks.
The third is force protection. Unmanned systems deployed ahead of ships, ports or critical infrastructure can detect, track and even engage threats before they reach their intended targets.
There is also the other side of the equation. This technology is relatively inexpensive, widely available and will not disappear when the war ends. Navies, port authorities and energy companies will have to adapt to a future in which unmanned systems are a permanent feature of the security environment.
Autonomy also raises questions that go beyond engineering. It touches on rules of engagement, human responsibility in the use of force and the legal status of unmanned vessels under international maritime law. The Black Sea states and their allies would be well advised to agree common standards sooner rather than later, before a crisis forces them to do so.
Adrian Leonard Mociulschi: Admiral, as we conclude our conversation, I would like to return to a theme that has run throughout our discussion. We have talked about the strategic importance of the Black Sea, the role of modern naval platforms and the growing impact of unmanned systems.
A significant part of this transformation is driven by the increasing use of drones, both as surveillance assets and as weapons. How should navies, ports and offshore infrastructure prepare for this challenge?
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Hasan Özyurt: I am glad you raised this question, because I believe it touches on the most urgent operational challenge facing navies today, both in the Black Sea and beyond.
At the heart of the problem lies cost asymmetry. A one-way attack drone or an explosive unmanned surface vessel may cost only tens of thousands of euros. The missiles carried by a warship to intercept such threats often cost many times more, and their numbers are necessarily limited. An adversary capable of launching drones in large numbers can exhaust a ship's magazine, or even strain a navy's budget, long before running out of drones. That is not a sustainable equation.
Navies have traditionally structured their defensive systems around two layers: area air defence designed to counter aircraft and missiles, and close-in weapon systems intended as the last line of defence. Drones have effectively created a gap between the two. They are too cheap and too numerous to justify the expenditure of high-end missiles, yet too threatening to be engaged only at the very last moment.
For that reason, I believe maritime counter-drone defence must be regarded as a separate mission area, supported by its own doctrine, sensors and engagement systems.
Three principles follow from this reality. First, detection must begin early and be capable of identifying very small targets, placing significant demands on radar systems and electro-optical sensors.
Second, the response must be proportionate to the threat. Guided rockets, programmable ammunition and, in the future, directed-energy systems offer a far more sustainable cost-exchange ratio against drones than high-end interceptor missiles.
Third, defence must be projected outward. Unmanned systems or lightly crewed platforms deployed ahead of a vessel, a harbour entrance or an offshore installation can detect, track and potentially neutralise a threat before it reaches its intended target.
Ports and energy infrastructure need the same thinking, and they need it now. They cannot move, they cannot hide, and they are often protected by civilian authorities rather than navies. Reducing that vulnerability requires cooperation among navies, coast guards, port operators, industry and neighbouring states.
The Black Sea, which has already shown the world how drones attack, can also lead in showing how to defend against them.
Adrian Leonard Mociulschi: Admiral, thank you for your time and for sharing your perspective with the readers of STIRIPESURSE.RO. Your reflections on the Black Sea, maritime security and autonomous systems have greatly enriched this discussion. It has been a privilege to host this conversation, and I wish you every success in your future activities.
Beyond Naval Warfare
After this conversation with Rear Admiral (Ret.) Özyurt, I find myself reflecting on a broader question. The story of the Black Sea is not only about ships, drones or military strategy. It is also a story about adaptation. Technologies change, doctrines evolve and new vulnerabilities emerge. Yet one principle remains constant: security ultimately depends on human judgement.
Perhaps that is the deeper lesson of the Black Sea.
An interview conducted by Dr. Adrian Leonard Mociulschi
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